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12.1 Introduction
Although many countries privatized their railways after 1987, the priva-
tization of the Japan National Railway (JNR) in that year marked the ﬁrst
sweeping reform of a national railway in the world. Privatization has been
accomplished in various ways in diﬀerent countries. Indeed, railway re-
structuring in Japan has been markedly diﬀerent from that in European
nations. In this paper, we will explain the Japanese approach to railway re-
form and discuss the experience gained and lessons learned from the pri-
vatization process.
This paper consists of ﬁve sections. Section 12.2 summarizes the privati-
zation of the JNR, explaining the impetus for privatization, the steps by
which it was achieved, the restructuring options that were available at the
time of privatization, and the general characteristics of this privatization.
An international comparison is also presented. Section 12.3 describes how
the management of the privatized Japan Railways (JRs) diﬀers from that
of the former JNR. While most privatization studies focus on regulatory
changes, we want to concentrate also on managerial issues such as corpo-
rate goals, relationships with interest groups, organizational structure, in-
centive systems, and task-improving activities. In section 12.4 we show per-
formance results of the regional railway companies after privatization,
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thank an anonymous referee for valuable questions.discussing not only overall performance but also rail fare, competition,
and the operation of local rail service, and presenting an international
comparison of these factors. In section 12.5 we consider several policy
issues related to rail restructuring, using as a basis for discussion these
topics: regional subdivision, functional division, vertical integration, and
yardstick competition. Finally, keeping in mind the situation of developing
countries, we outline important points related to rail privatization policy
in section 12.6.
12.2 A Summary of the Privatization of the Japan National Railway
12.2.1 The Road to Privatization
Reasons for Privatization
Along with two other huge public entities, Nippon Telephone and Tele-
graph and the Japan Monopoly Public Corporation (Tobacco and Salt),
which were privatized in the late 1980s, JNR began the process of privati-
zation in 1987, when it was partitioned into six regional passenger compa-
nies (the JRs) and one nationwide freight company.
As a public corporation, the JNR encountered numerous organizational
problems, including complacency due to a lack of a sense of crisis, an an-
tagonistic labor-management relationship, and political interference. Re-
forms were hindered by opposition from politicized labor unions, which
were divided into several organizations. The repeated failure of national-
ization produced ineﬀectual alternation between easy dependence on gov-
ernment subsidies and halfway reforms. In 1964, for the ﬁrst time in its
history, JNR showed an operating loss, its competitiveness having been
eroded by automation and the failure to reduce its heavy burden of redun-
dant employees. The hostile relationship between management and labor
unions profoundly damaged morale in the workplace and lowered produc-
tivity and the quality of service.
It gradually became evident to those both inside and outside JNR that
divestiture would be necessary to reduce the huge government subsidies
supporting JNR, and to enhance its eﬃciency. The idea that social infra-
structure could be paid for not by the government out of strained budgets
but with private funding was not new in Japan, since much railway service
had been and still is provided by private railway companies. Moreover,
since intermodal competition had drastically eroded the domain of JNR as
a natural monopoly and the potential for competition in the market was
extended, it became obvious that JNR, even though it was such a tradi-
tional and politically powerful entity, should be required to work within
the framework of a market economy. A divestiture plan was devised by
members of a special committee organized by several political entrepre-
neurs and by proprivatization management inside JNR.
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One important fact about the JNR privatization was that it was accom-
plished not all at once, but rather in a step-by-step manner. When railway
reform began in 1987, most stock of the newly established JRs continued
to be held by the public sector at Japan National Railway Settlement Cor-
poration (JNRSC), a temporary holding company established for this pur-
pose. Stock was not immediately oﬀered to the public, because the govern-
ment was concerned that the dismal reputation of the deﬁcit-laden and
ineﬃcient JNR would aﬀect stock prices negatively, and embarrassingly
few investors would be interested in acquiring stock in the new railway
companies. It was necessary to sell the stock at as high a price as possible,
to help alleviate some of the immense debt bequeathed by the JNR. The
newly created JNRSC would hold railway stocks until the newly privatized
companies could establish a reputation worthy of a respectable stock oﬀer-
ing, by increasing eﬃciency and showing proﬁts. Thus, although the date
of JNR’s privatization is given as 1987, strictly speaking the JNR was not
privatized that year but rather was launched onto a course toward privati-
zation.
Among the seven JR companies, the most rapidly privatized proved to
be JR East, 62.5 percent of whose stock went on the market in 1993. The
subsequent recession delayed the issuance of further stock until 1996,
when a portion of JR West’s shares went on the market, followed by JR
Central’s shares in 1997. As of 30 June 2002, all of JR East’s, 68.3 percent
of JR West’s, and 60.4 percent of JR Central’s shares were held by the pri-
vate sector. All shares of the other four JR companies, however, are still
held by the government, and a speciﬁc plan for their issuance has not been
determined (Mizutani and Nakamura 2000). By the end of 2002, the pri-
vatization of JNR remained incomplete, with the government still holding
portions of the JR companies’ stock. There is little doubt, however, that the
JR West and JR Central railway companies are headed toward full priva-
tization.
12.2.2 Restructuring Options
General Important Features of Restructuring
As Moyer and Thompson (1992) point out, the restructuring of a rail-
way business must focus on key elements that promote the ability of the
railway to meet the needs of its potential users: its assets, liabilities, work-
force, management style, and business strategy. As case studies in Europe,
North America, and Japan indicate, diﬀerent prototypes of restructuring
have been adopted to enhance the competitiveness of railways. The fol-
lowing are major options for asset restructuring of the railway: geographi-
cal division, vertical separation, and functional distinction.
The Japanese Experience with Railway Restructuring 307As for geographical division, because of a genetic trait of transport mar-
kets, the railway market and physical assets such as the track and terminals
can be divided geographically. Geographical market segmentations involve
separating freight and passenger markets into several subnetworks. In gen-
eral, traﬃc demands on railways are mainly local, or concentrated on spe-
ciﬁc segments of the networks, so that geographical segmentation may be
better suited to oﬀering services to meet local needs.
As for vertical separation, as in telecommunications and other public
utilities, the railway business constitutes (1) naturally monopolistic ele-
ments, such as track maintenance, and (2) potentially competitive ele-
ments, such as train operations and commercial functions. Unbundling
track maintenance (the lower part of railways) from train operations (the
upper part of railways), at least in theory, is considered one way to sharpen
the competitive edge of railways in the transport market. However, as the
case of British Rail indicates, the division of track from trains becomes
problematic because an adversarial relationship has developed between
the central track authorities and the train-operating companies. Problems
associated with vertical separation include high transaction costs, a need
for monitoring of the other’s performance, the diﬃculty in creating com-
plex performance schedules, and the stimulation of incentives for the track
authority to invest in new facilities to increase eﬃciency and improve
safety.
In terms of functional distinctions, railways basically serve two impor-
tant markets—passenger and freight—each with its own operational and
geographical uniqueness. A distinction between passenger and freight
markets is logical, because it would make the railway companies more re-
sponsive to speciﬁc needs of particular users. However, if economies of
scope between the related activities are known to be signiﬁcant, then a hor-
izontal distinction policy is not the best choice.
As far as asset reorganization for debt reduction is concerned, the vari-
ous mechanisms include selling nonessential assets by auction, oﬀering to
the public stock and land (including terminals), franchising or leasing, or
selling operating rights.
The Japanese Approach to Restructuring
What would be the best general practice for restructuring any railway?
Speciﬁc options are most suitable for achieving speciﬁc results. Later we
will discuss what options other nations have chosen in the restructuring of
their railways. In the case of Japan, because of the highly dense population
along the major railway lines and the extremely strong commuter demand
in metropolitan areas, vertical integration and geographical separation
may be the best choices for restructuring. Large economies of scope seem
to exist not only between related activities but also between railway and
nonrailway activities, including residential development along the lines,
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applied is perhaps most important for enhancing the eﬃciency and com-
petitiveness of railways, but there is no clear general answer to this ques-
tion. One critical question seems to be how structural reforms could in-
clude incentive mechanisms, because the structural policy of a railway
should go hand in hand with competitive measures for eﬃciency.
As we discussed in previous work, the Japanese approach to railway
privatization has six distinguishing features: (1) horizontal separation (or
regional subdivision), (2) functional distinction (or passenger-freight dis-
tinction), (3) vertical integration (or operation and infrastructure integra-
tion), (4) lump-sum subsidies for low-density JRs, (5) the establishment
of an intermediary institution, and (6) allowance of nonrail service (Mizu-
tani and Nakamura 1997). With this study, we add to the list a new distin-
guishing feature: (7) the yardstick competition scheme. We will brieﬂy
explain these characteristics.
The main problem with JNR was that it was too large an organization to
be managed properly and it was expected to operate even unproﬁtable lines
built only because of political inﬂuence. Thus it was decided that the com-
pany would be separated into six regional passenger railway companies,
and each company would gain control over decisions about which lines to
operate and which lines to close. After consideration of several options for
separation, regional subdivision by geographical demand was decided
upon. The smaller, subdivided companies would be expected to meet their
users’ local needs, and to compete with each other to improve their perfor-
mance. In this subdivision, 95 percent of all trips would be completed
within the borders of these regions. In addition to two distinct regional
JRs—JR East and JR West in the Tokyo and Osaka metropolitan areas,
respectively—JR Central, based in Nagoya, was appointed to be the oper-
ator of the most proﬁtable trunk-line, Shinkansen, between Tokyo and
Osaka.
Second, because of the growth of the trucking industry, whose increas-
ing success had caused a severe decline in the share of rail freight business,
it was decided to separate JR Freight from the passenger JRs. Were JR
Freight to remain within the fold of the passenger JRs, it was feared that
managerial responsibility for its losses would be vague and its poor per-
formance would damage the morale and the good results the healthier pas-
senger companies were bound to achieve. To avoid an excessive ﬁnancial
burden on JR Freight, however, it would be allowed to borrow tracks from
infrastructure-holding passenger JRs, instead of holding the infrastruc-
ture itself. Regional separation was not chosen, in order to retain scale
merit.
Third, unlike in the European rail industry and in marked contrast to the
privatization of British Rail, vertical integration was maintained after pri-
vatization. In theory, it was possible to introduce vertical separation of
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fore privatization (Suga 1997). Most railways in Japan are privately owned,
integrated systems, and their success most likely made vertical separation
seem an unattractive and excessively complicated option. Furthermore,
since major urban private railways have been increasing proﬁts by diversi-
fying into various businesses—such as running department stores and ho-
tels at stations, developing residential land along the tracks, and promot-
ing tourism—privatized JRs were expected to behave likewise, making the
integration of track ownership and train operation desirable in light of the
possibility for diversiﬁcation.
Fourth, in order to stabilize the management situation for smaller JRs,
a lump-sum subsidy scheme was implemented through the Management
Stabilization Fund (MSF), with interest revenues from the fund to cover
these subsidies. Since the three-islands JRs were handicapped by geo-
graphical locations with relatively small populations and the rapid devel-
opment in their regions of highway networks, lump-sum funds (1,278 bil-
lion yen) were channeled to these JRs. The fund, which originally took the
form of a ten-year debt owned by the JNRSC, was supposed to yield inter-
est and subsidize the operating losses of these JRs. However, the market in-
terest rate decreased so that the interest revenues could not cover the op-
erating deﬁcits of the three-islands JRs. Therefore, a new scheme was
implemented in 1997 whereby the Corporation for Advanced Transport
and Technology (CATT) borrowed portions of the MSF funds of the three-
islands JRs at a ﬁxed interest rate of 4.99 percent, higher than the market
rate. Scheduled to be eliminated by the end of ﬁscal year 2001, this scheme
was extended to ﬁscal year 2006. Without the MSF these JRs will go in the
red, making them unattractive candidates for listing on the stock market,
so they have postponed plans for issuing their stock.
Fifth, JNRSC was set up as an intermediate institution to repay the
debts of the JNR and to ﬁnd new jobs for its redundant employees. The
Japanese government and JNR management placed top priority on facili-
tating the transfer of dismissed employees to other sectors by enacting a
special law for reemployment of former JNR workers in the process of pri-
vatization. As a result, in contrast to privatization practices elsewhere in
the world, little labor rationalization was undertaken. To avoid sweeping
layoﬀs, every imaginable means of reducing unemployment and social
conﬂict was introduced, including transfers to local governments, public
organizations such as the National Tax Administration Agency, the Police
Agency, the Meteorological Agency, and the ﬂourishing Nippon Tele-
phone and Telegraph as well. Moreover, the JNRSC was established to
transfer these redundant workers smoothly to other sectors. With generous
inducements for voluntary retirement, reduction in the workforce had be-
gun well before the implementation of privatization, so that only 1,047 re-
mained to be dismissed in the process of privatization.
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companies have been doing in Japan for decades. To increase demand for
rail transportation, private rail companies conduct such businesses as hous-
ing development, tourism, and the operation of other modes of transport
such as buses. The JR companies have begun to follow the example of these
private railways and tried their luck in various non-rail-related enterprises.
Finally, a yardstick competition scheme was introduced. Under this
scheme, rail operators compete with each other to improve performance,
and the regulator assesses the operators’ performance by using common
measures. The results of this assessment are to be used when fare revision
is being considered.
Regulatory Changes and Ongoing Plans
Table 12.1 shows regulatory changes and ongoing plans since privatiza-
tion. First, the organizational form was converted from a public corpora-
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Table 12.1 Major Regulatory Changes with Privatization, and Desired Results
Before Privatization After Privatization Desired Result
Organization Public corporation Special corporations Genuinely private com-
panies
Operations Nationwide service Six regional passenger  No change
companies and one 
freight company for all 
Japan
Rail services Integrated services of  Separation of passenger  No change, but possibly 
passenger and freight and freight services reorganization of the 
freight company
Scope of  Rail-related services  Nonrail businesses (e.g.,  More diversiﬁcation of 
business only residential development,  businesses
tourism) allowed
Approval of  Approval by the Diet Approval by the  Notiﬁcation to Ministry 
fare Transport Minister of Land, Infrastructure, 
and Transport
Fare  Strict control by the  Strict control by the  Incentive regulations 
regulation government government; installation  such as price caps
of yardstick competition 
scheme in January 1997
Investment and  Capital supplied by the  Japan Railway companies  No ministerial approval 
ﬁnancing government and invest- allowed to invest without  needed on important 
ment plan requiring  Diet approval but minis- business matters, 
Diet approval terial approval required including the appoint-
ment of top executives, 
bond issuance, and 
borrowingtion, which was one government body, to a special corporation in a stock-
company-style commercial body, still regulated by special laws (Mizutani
1999b). These are expected to become fully private corporations, and the
special laws related to them are to be abolished.
Second, operations and rail services were divided into six regional pas-
senger companies and one nationwide freight rail company. So far, there
are no speciﬁc further plans, but freight rail services might be reorganized
because of recent concerns about environmental issues and competition
with trucks.
Third, as for scope of business, as we mentioned above, JRs have been
allowed to be involved in nonrail business since privatization, and these ac-
tivities continue to expand, with the aim of securing rail ridership and fully
utilizing internal resources.
As for fare approval and fare regulation, governmental intervention has
been lighter after privatization. Before privatization, rail fare was approved
by the Diet but is now regulated by the Transport Ministry, which is still ul-
timately a division of the national government. However, yardstick regula-
tion has been introduced as an incentive scheme, and quite recently oﬃ-
cials have begun to consider a price-cap scheme for determining rail fare.
Since privatization, the government has intervened less in matters of in-
vestment and ﬁnancing, as well as in other areas of corporate management,
such as the appointment of directors. Special laws and regulations have
been enacted, including guarantees of a certain degree of autonomy in the
JRs’ management. This contrasts with the situation that existed in the JNR
era when there was a great deal of pressure from and tinkering by politi-
cians; their intervention had deleterious eﬀects on the eﬃciency of JNR
management. The full privatization expected to be realized eventually at all
the JRs will aﬀord their managers even more freedom to conduct their
business as they see ﬁt.
JNR Debts and the JNR Settlement Corporation
The transfer of 37.1 trillion yen of liabilities was supervised by the
JNRSC, which itself took on about 60 percent of the total debt and was ex-
pected to liquidate this liability by selling JNR-owned real estate (7.7 tril-
lion yen) and stocks (1.2 trillion yen). The remaining 40 percent of the
long-term debt was allocated to the three main-island passenger JRs. The
three small-island JRs were exempted from liability because their prof-
itability was very uncertain, given the small size of their markets and lower
population density. Originally, it was expected that the taxpayer bear the
burden of the more than 13.8 trillion yen debt. The JNRSC has sold 6.22
million shares of the three main-island JRs’ stock, out of a total of 9.19 mil-
lion shares. The corporation has paid back 2.7 trillion yen. However, due
to the delay in sales of stock and land after the collapse of the asset-inﬂated
bubble economy in the early 1990s, the JNRSC’s liabilities have been in-
312 Fumitoshi Mizutani and Kiyoshi Nakamuracreasing because of staggering interest payments of about 1 trillion yen an-
nually.
Although the JNRSC was reorganized as a division of the Japan Rail-
way Construction Public Corporation (JRCC) and named the Japan
Settlement Headquarters in 1998, there has been no change in the long-
term debt issue. In spite of the current plan of JRCC to pay back 3.9 tril-
lion yen by selling JR stocks and land, taxpayers will have to shoulder the
24.1 trillion yen loan, which is to be repaid from the general-account bud-
get over the next sixty years.
The Shinkansen Holding Company
The Shinkansen Holding Company was organized to own and lease in-
frastructure properties of the Shinkansen and to allocate the resulting
proﬁts to the three main-island JRs. It was disbanded because the leasing
system would be problematic when Shinkansen assets would be disposed
of at the end of the leasing period. The Shinkansen assets were sold to
the three main-island JRs through an installment plan, further increasing
these JRs’ long-term debt. The resulting problem was so severe that even
JR Central, although it owns the most proﬁtable Shinkansen line between
Tokyo and Osaka, must make annual interest payments worth one-quarter
of its yearly earnings.
12.2.3 An International Comparison of Rail Restructuring
For comparative purposes, we consider examples of reform of national
railways in three European nations: France, Sweden, and the United King-
dom. Table 12.2summarizes the main features of the restructuring of these
nations’ railways.
While the Japanese chose a vertically integrated structure, vertical sepa-
ration seems more common in Europe, although the adoption schedule
diﬀers from country to country. Sweden took a separation policy early on,
while France did so more recently, according to the Europe Conference of
Ministers of Transport ([ECMT] 1998). Second, ownership of established
rail companies is diﬀerent among countries, with the most radical change
occurring in the United Kingdom, where newly established train operating
companies (TOCs) and the infrastructure provider Railtrack are all joint
stock companies. JR companies also are intended to be joint stock com-
panies, but their evolvement into such is ongoing and less drastic than in
the case of the British Rail. In both France and Sweden, state railway com-
panies are still owned by the public sector, although rail operations are pro-
vided on a commercial basis.
Presumably, decisions related to structure and ownership reﬂect the gen-
eral opinion of a nation as to how involved the public sector should be in
the rail industry. In France and Sweden, state inﬂuence on investment de-
cisions is still higher than in the United Kingdom. In Japan, while the JNR


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.was interfered with rather heavily by the government, the JRs are relatively
free of political interference. As for service obligations to the public, Eu-
ropean railways clearly are obliged to maintain service, with services in the
United Kingdom and Sweden being decided by competitive tendering. In
Japan there is no legal obligation to maintain local services, but depopu-
lated communities often negotiate with JR companies regarding the main-
tenance of local lines and other matters related to local service. This results
in what might be called a type of unoﬃcial social contract between the rail
companies and local communities.
Finally, as for rail service operation, horizontal separation was selected
in Japan and the United Kingdom, while state railway companies have
taken over most services in France and Sweden. Of the four railways un-
der observation here, the United Kingdom’s system seems to have under-
gone the most drastic change, with each regional operating company se-
lected by competitive tendering. In Japan, each regional JR company is
given a rail license outright, so that there is no need to compete for infra-
structure.
12.3 Managerial Reforms at JR
12.3.1 Management Goals
Sumita (2000) argued from his experience that in state-owned corpora-
tions, management responsibility is not clariﬁed, so even if performance
targets are not met, there is no need to assume responsibility as long as the
best possible eﬀorts have been exerted. One important problem of the JNR
was the intervention of many stakeholders: politicians, government oﬃ-
cials, unions, and rail users. Intervention from these groups could not be
avoided, resulting in a complete loss of independence for JNR. For ex-
ample, government oﬃcials and managers of JNR wishing to manage it
more eﬃciently might deem it necessary to reduce wages and increase
fares, while unions and rail users might ﬁnd these actions unacceptable and
put pressure on the government not to change. Conﬂicting interests led to
vague “solutions,” and the goals of the JNR became unclear; in fact, its
performance goals were drawn up solely for the sake of convenience, in or-
der to have pertinent laws or the budget passed by the Diet. After privati-
zation, the goals of the JRs became clearer.
12.3.2 Relationships with Interest Groups
Massive strikes by labor unions often occurred at the end of the JNR era,
and the relationship between management and labor unions was at its
worst (Mizutani 1999a). Since then, the situation has improved, mainly be-
cause management and labor unions seem to be working toward the same
goals, with management now giving rewards in the form of salary increases
316 Fumitoshi Mizutani and Kiyoshi Nakamurawhen performance has improved. This, in turn, seems to lead to further im-
provement and an increased sense of trust.
It is not clear how relationships with the local community have changed
since privatization, but it is certain that before privatization they were not
good. Sumita (2000) suggests that the local community was a rather
spoiled interest group using private automobiles to distribute petitions de-
manding extra services from the JNR and protesting loudly when loss-
making lines were slated for elimination. A cooperative relationship be-
tween communities and the JNR was made diﬃcult mostly because local
autonomous municipalities were forbidden by law to furnish subsidies to
JNR. In the process of privatization, many local lines were converted to
bus services or other rail companies which were owned by both the private
and public sectors. As we will explain later, there is still the possibility of
future conﬂict between the two groups with regard to maintaining local
service in small communities.
12.3.3 Organizational Structure
Newly established JRs have assumed a structural form designed to fa-
cilitate decision making. JNR had been an unwieldy and bureaucratic or-
ganization, unresponsive to external change. It was clearly too large to be
a single organization and too centralized for eﬃcient decision making. As
a result, there were several problems, such as the excessive length of time it
took to make a decision and the inability of the organization to meet local
needs quickly. To approve a single initiative, it was necessary to circulate
documents among twenty to thirty people who would stamp them with
their personal seals (Ishi, Okada, and Yada 1994). JNR’s reform therefore
stipulated not only privatization but also regional subdivision into organ-
izations smaller than JNR. Moreover, the JRs themselves became less cen-
tralized organizations in general. For example, branch oﬃces now have
more freedom to use their own judgment when making a decision.
Public enterprises lack the will to economize on construction costs or
general expenses because generating earnings is not necessarily the ﬁrst
priority of the operation, at least not in Japan. Once agreed upon, budgets,
whether at a state or local government level, must be spent in their entirety,
and those making eﬀorts to economize and save portions of the budget are
regarded as naive. Therefore, almost no eﬀorts are made in these entities to
reduce expenditures, and corporate performance is generally poor. On the
other hand, private enterprises must generate earnings, or failures would
make it impossible to survive in a market where competition from the au-
tomobile and airline industries is a constant threat.
As for organizational structure, two kinds of reforms are important: the
change to a ﬂat organization and the introduction of an M-form type of
structure. First, like most government entities, the JNR was a typical hier-
archy with a vertical organization. Government ministries in the past have
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individual bureaus operated separately but the ministries as a whole failed
to function as coordinated units (Sumita 2000). In order to improve upon
this kind of organization, ﬁrst, hierarchy became more ﬂat, evolving from
four stages—(1) division manager, (2) section manager, (3) section vice-
manager, and (4) subsection—to three stages: (1) division manager, (2) sec-
tion manager, and (3) subsection. This change shortened decision-making
time (Kitani 1997). However, in Mizutani’s study (1999a), based on struc-
tural maps made available by each JR, the number of divisions increased
by about 40 percent from 1987 to 1995. Furthermore, as for characteristics
of structural changes, the Honshu JRs show an increase in management di-
visions and branch oﬃces while the three-islands JRs show an increase in
nonmanagement divisions.
Second, the traditional JNR organization was divided into groups with
similar job skills, and the decision making of each division was sometimes
superior to the decision making of the entire organization. In other words,
the old organizational structure encouraged sectionalism and frequently
resulted in divisions’ consciously thwarting each other, a serious obstacle
to getting the entire organization to achieve its full potential. For example,
according to Sumita (2000), JNR’s civil engineering group was powerful
and there were members of the Diet from this group, so that the civil-
engineering contingent had a ﬁrm hold on a major portion of the budget
for many years—a situation that may have accounted for a surfeit of new
line construction in the JNR era. To avoid the possibility of a similar prob-
lem developing, the M-form type of organization was introduced when the
privatization process began. For example, JR East set out to streamline
its organization and unify separate departments performing similar work.
Sumita reported that integration and uniﬁcation resulted in information’s
no longer being restricted to one group exclusive of all others, and in a
growing feeling of team spirit throughout the company as a whole.
12.3.4 Incentive Systems
A more private, company-style performance rating system was intro-
duced. The wage system at JNR was based mostly on age and seniority,
a system with no built-in incentive to improve performance. However,
Sumita (2000) noted that when JR East listed its shares on the stock mar-
ket in 1993, the majority of its employees opted to become shareholders.
Partially owning the company where they work has proved to be a major
morale and incentive booster for both management and employees.
12.3.5 Task-Improving Activities
As for task improvement, activities such as the quality control (QC)
circle, the suggestion system, and other forms of action have been taken at
318 Fumitoshi Mizutani and Kiyoshi Nakamurathe initiative of employees. The QC Circle and the suggestion system are
very popular among manufacturing and construction companies in Japan
and are used to make clear the task responsibility of each employee. In our
experience, we cannot state without reserve that these schemes help im-
prove productivity, but Sumita (2000) reported that more than 5 billion yen
per year is being saved through the QC Circle, the suggestion system, and
other forms of action taken at the initiative of employees.
12.4 The Performance of JRs after Privatization
12.4.1 Overall Performance Changes
Comparisons since Privatization
In this section, we will evaluate the overall performance of JR compa-
nies since privatization. For a detailed comparison between before and af-
ter privatization, please see our previous research, such as Mizutani and
Nakamura (1996, 1997). The overall performance of the six JR companies
since privatization is summarized in table 12.3, where we selected nine per-
formance measures and compared three time periods: (1) the beginning of
privatization (1987); (2) the ﬁfth year after privatization (1992); and (3) the
most recent year (1998). In this analysis, we use as a benchmark the per-
formance results of ﬁfteen large private railways.
Overall performance for most JRs has been improved since privatiza-
tion. However, compared with the numbers in 1992, the most recent results
seem desultory, perhaps due to the recent recession in the Japanese econ-
omy. JR Freight’s ﬁnancial performance (operating revenues–cost ratio)
was especially dismal, sinking to a level lower than at the beginning of pri-
vatization.
Among these measures, eﬃciency has been much improved since pri-
vatization. Certainly, labor productivity has been improving. In our pre-
vious study (Mizutani and Nakamura 1996), the JRs’ labor productivity
after privatization was shown to be still inferior to that of large private
railways, but the diﬀerence may have disappeared by now. The measure
of JR Central was higher than for large private railways in 1998. In fact,
when we compared the total productivity growth of JRs with that of pri-
vate railways, the average annual growth rate of JRs shows much higher
values: for 1987–1992, JR (11.40 percent), private (–0.70 percent); and
for 1993–1998, (–0.48 percent), private (–0.03 percent). As for the aver-
age costs, the level was certainly lower than in 1987. The rate of decrease
in average operating cost is higher than that of large private railways.
Thus, when we compare the JRs’ eﬃciency measures to those of large
private railways, we ﬁnd that the JRs’ measures are improving signiﬁ-
cantly.































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Rail fare at JNR was expected to cover all rail costs, but was based on
the outcome of political deals, not on sound economic judgment. Political
interference in rail operation and investment increased rail costs and led to
ineﬃciency, resulting in a fare increase almost every year from 1981 until
1987, when privatization began. Table 12.4 shows the record of fare revi-
sion of the JRs, which, other than the three-islands JRs, did not increase
fare level during the ten years after privatization, excepting the two years
immediately following the introduction of the consumption tax. Main-
taining fare at the same level as at the start of privatization indicates that
the real value is decreasing, and an increase in ridership can be expected.
In fact, Sumita (2000) reports that JR East has made every eﬀort not to in-
crease rail fare. Thus, one important eﬀect of the privatization of JNR was
to stop the almost yearly increase in fare.
Parallel Rail Lines
Rail fare at the JR companies after privatization became more compet-
itive than that of other private rail companies, the most notable case being
on JR lines parallel with private rail company lines in large metropolitan
areas. Table 12.5 shows a rail fare comparison between JR and large private
rail companies along some selected parallel lines. The table shows that in
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Table 12.4 The Increasing Percentage of Passenger and Freight Rates since 1980
Date of Revision Passenger (%) Freight (%)
Before Privatization
20 April 1981 9.7 9.7
20 April 1982 6.1 6.3
20 April 1984 8.2 4.2
20 April 1985 4.4 3.1
1 September 1986 4.8 —
After Privatization
1 April 1989a 2.9 3.0
10 January 1996 7.0b 3.0
6.7c
7.8d
1 April 1997e 1.9 1.9
Source: Ministry of Transport (2000, 115).




eIncreased consumption tax rate to 5 percent.almost all cases the diﬀerence in fare level between JRs and large private
rail companies became smaller, and in some cases the JRs’ fare level be-
came even lower.
The JRs’ decreasing relative fare level is certainly due to the increase in
productive eﬃciency caused by the privatization of JNR. Clearly, the unit
cost of JR companies has decreased compared with that of JNR, making
it a matter of course that JRs’ price level has become lower.
Notably, the decrease in JR fare to the level of that of private railways
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Table 12.5 Fare Comparison between Japan Railway Companies (JRs) and Major Private
Railways of Selected Competitive Lines
Regular Fare  Commuter Rail Pass 
(Yen per Month) (Yen)
Section of a Line Operator 01/04/1986 01/10/2000 01/04/1986 01/10/2000
Tokyo
Ueno-Narita JR East 730 890 21,500 26,280
Keisei 680 810 17,400 21,920
JR/private 1.07 1.10 1.24 1.20
Shinjuku-Hachioji JR East 440 460 13,200 13,860
Keio 290 350 9,300 13,190
JR/private 1.52 1.31 1.42 1.05
Shinagawa-Yokohama JR East 260 280 7,800 8,190
Keikyu 230 290 7,580 11,260
JR/private 1.13 0.97 1.03 0.73
Nagoya
Nagoya-Gifu JR Central 480 450 12,460 13,080
Meitetsu 480 540 12,460 16,340
JR/private 1.00 0.83 1.00 0.80
Nagoya-Yokkaichi JR Central 440 460 13,200 13,860
Kintetsu 430 610 11,500 19,780
JR/private 1.02 0.75 1.15 0.70
Osaka
Tennoji (Nanba)– JR West 730 830 21,500 24,750
Wakayama Nankai 700 890 15,500 25,050
JR/private 1.04 0.93 1.39 0.99
Osaka (Umeda)– JR West 380 390 11,400 11,960
Sannomiya Hankyu 230 310 8,780 12,480
JR/private 1.65 1.26 1.30 0.96
Fukuoka
Hakata (Fukuoka)– JR Kyushu 590 720 16,600 20,750
Kurume Nishitetsu 500 600 14,850 22,280
JR/private 1.18 1.20 1.12 0.93
Hakata (Fukuoka)– JR Kyushu 1,000 1,250 28,760 33,980
Omuta Nishitetsu 850 1,000 22,500 29,480
JR/private 1.18 1.25 1.28 1.15
Sources: Ministry of Transport (2000, 110–111; 1986, 88–89).was not the same for all lines. In general, cases in the Nagoya and Osaka
areas, where there are more parallel lines, showed larger decreases than
cases in the Tokyo area. During the JNR era, JNR lines were not consid-
ered serious competition for the private railway lines parallel to them, but
after privatization, each regional JR company has aimed to make all re-
gional lines more competitive, with a resulting close in the price gap.
12.4.3 Competition
One important and distinguishing eﬀect of the privatization of the JNR
is that competition has worked actively in many ways. First, the Shin-
kansen became a viable alternative to the airplane along the major long-
distance trunk corridor, with popular routes being Tokyo-Osaka, Osaka-
Fukuoka, Tokyo-Fukuoka, Tokyo-Yamagata, and Tokyo-Akita. The
companies focused mainly on shortening transport time, but attention was
paid also to service quality and price. For example, JR West has actively
introduced new types of rail cars between Osaka and Fukuoka in order to
win business trips from air transportation. The new types of cars provide
new amenities such as compartment rooms for meetings, electrical outlets
for personal computers, and silent cars for passengers who want to rest.
Furthermore, travel time has been reduced by more than 20 percent.
In the medium distance, bus transportation might be a competitive
mode. For example, direct service from city center to airport could be a
typical case of medium-distance bus service. Although there is no statisti-
cal evidence, convenient direct bus services are emerging as strong com-
petitors of privatized JR companies.
The privatization of the JNR has aﬀected other transport organizations,
attracting business away from them and reducing their ridership. In the
greater Osaka metropolitan area, JR lines run parallel with lines of other
private rail companies, giving rail users a choice (Nakamura and Mizutani
1995). Table 12.6 shows trends in the number of passengers and share in
rails in the greater Osaka metropolitan area. From this table we can clearly
see that the ridership of the JRs after privatization has increased while
private rail companies have been gradually losing some of their competi-
tiveness, so that in 1997 their share became less than 50 percent. However,
the subway system operated by the local government has not been aﬀected
by the privatization of JNR, as its network does not signiﬁcantly overlap
with JR lines.
On 20 March 1996, a new movement was begun in Osaka: a consortium
of transport organizations called “Surutto Kansai,” (“Go through Kan-
sai”), whose purpose is to increase users’ convenience. Under this consor-
tium, rail users can avoid buying separate tickets from separate railway or
bus companies along their desired routes by purchasing prepaid cards that
can be used on all facilities of the consortium’s members. Originally there
324 Fumitoshi Mizutani and Kiyoshi Nakamurawere ﬁve member organizations, such as Hankyu and the Osaka city trans-
port bureau. Four years later, in May 2000, twenty-six transport organiza-
tions had joined the consortium, and its network accounted for 792.1 km
in rail lines and 2,375.2 km in bus routes. JR West is not speciﬁcally ex-
cluded from this consortium, but becoming a member would require the
installation of ticket gate machines compatible with those of all other
members, and JR West has so far opted not to undertake this installation.
Whether as a result of this omission or not, an atmosphere of JR-versus-
the-Others has taken hold in the Osaka metropolitan area.
The advantages of joining the consortium are as follows. First, an in-
crease in ridership is expected due to expansion of network. Second, in-
vestment costs for system development such as for ticket gate machines can
be avoided because the system is developed jointly. Third, advertising of
the joint network can be expected without loss of management freedom in
each organization. An advantage for users is the convenience of not having
to buy tickets when changing modes of transportation. The consortium
can also be judged to be good for society in that it protects the environment
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Table 12.6 Trends in Number of Passengers and Share in Rails in the Greater
Osaka Metropolitan Area
Numbers of Passengers (thousands) Share of Passengers (%)
JR Private JR Private
West Rails Subways West Rails Subways
1980 1,086,022 2,508,336 813,318 0.246 0.569 0.185
1981 1,079,424 2,515,534 986,452 0.236 0.549 0.215
1982 1,059,261 2,495,711 1,009,021 0.232 0.547 0.221
1983 1,065,140 2,515,052 1,036,329 0.231 0.545 0.224
1984 1,068,560 2,501,624 1,046,038 0.231 0.542 0.227
1985 1,074,479 2,574,773 960,198 0.233 0.559 0.208
1986 1,088,105 2,613,680 975,768 0.233 0.559 0.209
1987a 1,145,095 2,623,316 921,938 0.244 0.559 0.197
1988 1,203,132 2,652,969 1,076,853 0.244 0.538 0.218
1989 1,197,248 2,672,564 1,096,877 0.241 0.538 0.221
1990 1,228,650 2,715,036 1,156,811 0.241 0.532 0.227
1991 1,264,666 2,777,166 1,167,219 0.243 0.533 0.224
1992 1,304,737 2,747,929 1,168,136 0.250 0.526 0.224
1993 1,367,843 2,726,708 1,161,090 0.260 0.519 0.221
1994 1,308,396 2,885,756 1,135,110 0.246 0.541 0.213
1995 1,380,645 2,590,129 1,157,746 0.269 0.505 0.226
1996b 1,384,975 2,601,995 1,145,749 0.270 0.507 0.223
1997 1,379,976 2,502,765 1,151,611 0.274 0.497 0.229
1998 1,366,037 2,439,685 1,140,150 0.276 0.493 0.231
aPrivatization.
bConsortium.by encouraging the use of public transportation over private cars. Accord-
ing to the administrative oﬃce of the consortium, the number of prepaid
users has been steadily increasing but a clear eﬀect is not yet evident.
12.4.4 Local Services
Previously, we showed performance results in a proﬁtable market. In this
section, we will explain results occurring in an unproﬁtable market. Before
the privatization of JNR, there was considerable debate about whether lo-
cal rail services in small communities would remain intact. The concern
was that newly privatized rail companies would ruthlessly eliminate any
unproﬁtable lines, leaving the transportation-poor, such as children, the
elderly, and the handicapped, to fend for themselves. Quite recently, an em-
pirical investigation of this issue was undertaken by Mizutani (1999a).
The methodology is as follows. First, Mizutani selected local rail lines of
six passenger JRs. Second, by using timetables, he obtained several service
quality measures in both the ﬁrst year of privatization (1987) and the tenth
year after privatization (1997). He then compared these service quality
measures for the two time periods. As observations, he chose a total of
thirty-ﬁve lines from six passenger JRs by considering regional diﬀerences
and service quality measures such as (1) departure time of the ﬁrst train,
(2) departure time of the last train, (3) operating time per given section of
rail line, (4) number of trains per day, (5) number of trains per oﬀ-peak
hour, and (6) travel time in a given 30 km.
Mizutani’s conclusion is that, overall, local rail service in small commu-
nities has been maintained since privatization, negating the fear of those
who predicted that privatization would damage or even eliminate local rail
service. To a certain extent, it is not surprising that local lines have fared so
well, considering the ﬁnancial health of the JRs since privatization. Even
the three-islands JRs, which have been less fortunate ﬁnancially, have man-
aged to maintain their local lines.
However, if the ﬁnancial situation takes a turn for the worse, the concern
remains that the rail companies may at some point choose to abandon ser-
vice, even though they have so far chosen to keep unproﬁtable lines despite
there being no legal obligation to do so. Quite recently, however, JR West
has sent out signals that it is becoming more diﬃcult to maintain several
local lines in small communities, and recent drastic reductions in oﬀ-peak
services found on timetables from April 2001 augur that some sacriﬁces
can be expected in the near future. The deﬁcits of some local lines are be-
ing covered by cross-subsidies derived from the JRs’ proﬁtable transport
operations in major urban areas. Local rail services will be abolished or
converted to bus services if the JRs cannot make enough proﬁts from ma-
jor urban lines or eﬃciently use internal resources such as employees. Ac-
cording to Sumita (2000), in the future the number of surplus personnel
326 Fumitoshi Mizutani and Kiyoshi Nakamuramay fall to zero, making it diﬃcult to secure suﬃcient personnel to oper-
ate the local lines.
12.4.5 An International Comparison of Performance Changes
In this section, we will compare performance changes among typical rail
companies in which diﬀerent kinds of railway reform have been under-
taken. We selected the same organizations used earlier: the JRs, British
Rail (BR), Swedish State Railways (SJ), and French National Railways
(SNCF). Table 12.7 gives a summary of performance changes. In this table,
the reform of SNCF, in which the French Railway Network (RFF) was es-
tablished, was accomplished in 1997, so that these numbers are all repre-
sentative of SNCF. The privatization of BR occurred in 1993, so that the
numbers for BR in 1995 are the combined numbers of TOCs and Railtrack.
Rail reform in Sweden took place in 1988, so that numbers since 1989 are
the combined numbers of SJ and Banverket (BV). Finally, JNR’s privati-
zation began in 1987, so that the numbers since 1987 are the total numbers
from the seven JR companies. These statistics have been calculated by the
authors based on the original from the International Union of Railways.
This table shows, ﬁrst, that railway reforms commonly lead to an in-
crease in labor productivity, and have certainly done so in the United King-
dom, Sweden, and Japan. The growth ratio of labor productivity of re-
formed railways is higher than that of nonreformed railways. For example,
the growth percentage between 1987 and 1995 for SNCF was 1.179 but
was 1.668 for BR, 1.598 for SJ, and 1.255 for the JRs. Labor productivity
growth was accomplished mainly through the reduction of employees.
The second beneﬁt of rail reform is the subsequent increase in rail de-
mand. For passenger transport, both the JRs and SJ increased demand be-
tween 1987 and 1995. Although the statistics for BR in this table shows a
decrease, the demand for passenger transport began an upturn after 1995,
according to one source (Preston and Root 1999, 52). However, reform
does not seem to aﬀect freight service, with all freight services except SJ
continuing to show a decrease. According to one source (Alexandersson
and Hulten 1999, 114), even SJ suﬀered a sharp decline in freight service
after 1996: 16.5 billion tons per kilometer in 1996, 14.7 billion tons per
kilometer in 1997.
On the other hand, diﬀerent results were found among railways regard-
ing the operating revenue–cost ratio, a measure that greatly increased for
the JRs but that decreased for all other railways. Although both BR and SJ
were reformed, this measure worsened, most likely due to an increase in
operating costs, with operating costs increasing most drastically in the
United Kingdom. We know that operating costs rose both for operation
and infrastructure, but due to a lack of available information, we cannot
give details.



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.In conclusion, we regret that we cannot discern clearly from our results
what kind of railway reform works best in every case. Part of our inability
to do so is the consequence of a lack of available data. We hope that as rail-
way-reform data accumulate, we will be able by econometric techniques to
obtain results that will guide us in making wiser policy decisions in the fu-
ture.
12.5 Selected Important Lessons
12.5.1 Regional Subdivision: Horizontal Separation
We believe that the policy calling for the subdivision of the nationwide
Japanese railway system was correct. The issues are how the system should
be divided and how big each organization should be. As for the ﬁrst ques-
tion, while other alternatives for dividing the JNR were discussed both of-
ﬁcially and unoﬃcially, regional subdivision was selected. At least three
other possible options were discussed: four regional subdivisions based on
the four main islands (Honshu, Hokkaido, Shikoku, and Kyushu); about
twenty regional subdivisions based upon the branch oﬃces of JNR; and di-
vision into trunk lines and branch lines. The last two were rejected, ﬁrst,
because there was great ﬁnancial variation among the twenty subdivisions
due to diﬀering rail demand conditions, and second, because branch lines
could not be ﬁnancially independent. As for the proposed four subdivi-
sions, the Honshu region was considered to be too large compared with the
other three, thus needing further subdivision. In addition to these three al-
ternatives, a division into urban rail operation and intercity rail operation
was suggested, but was rejected as not feasible technically because both
operations use the same tracks.
Regional subdivision of the passenger rail service seems to be function-
ing well so far. First, yardstick competition has improved the overall per-
formance of the JRs. Second, more regional needs have been met, partic-
ularly with improvements in frequency. Third, as for the integration of
railway services into diﬀerent regional organizations, not many problems
have been reported, although the number of interregional rail services has
decreased.
As for the second issue, six regional passenger companies were created.
One problem in Japan is the wide variation in the size of the six regional
passenger rail organizations, reﬂecting demand and transportation den-
sity. The Honshu JRs (JR East, JR Central, and JR West) are in a highly
advantageous position compared with the three-islands JRs (JR Hok-
kaido, JR Shikoku, and JR Kyushu). As for the size of organization in
terms of cost, there is a problem. According to Preston (1996), the optimal
railway size for minimizing operating costs might have a network of
around 4,000 km and run 120 million train-km per annum. His pioneering
330 Fumitoshi Mizutani and Kiyoshi Nakamuraresults provide useful information for the restructuring of the rail industry
but, for us, have the limitation of having been obtained from European
state railways. It is necessary to get more precise information about pri-
vately owned railways.
Research on the optimal size of rail organizations has recently been
done by Mizutani (2001), who estimated the total cost function for pooling
data of ﬁfty-nine privately owned urban railways for every ﬁve years from
1970 to 1995 in Japan. He calculated the railway size to attain the minimum
average cost in terms of service output and network size. That is, he ob-
tained the size by diﬀerentiating the average cost function by three mea-
sures: service output, number of lines, and average line length. He found
the optimal size, which attains the minimum average cost, to be about 128
million vehicle-km per year with a network of 15.0 km per line, and with
ﬁve lines. In this case, the average costs are 418.8 yen per vehicle-km. The
optimal size in terms of output is found to be smaller than Preston’s (1996)
result, which shows that the optimal size in terms of train-km is 120 mil-
lion. When we translate Mizutani’s result of output to train-km, the result
would be about 43 million train-km (  128 million vehicle-km / 3 cars per
train). Furthermore, in terms of network size, Mizutani’s result is much
smaller than Preston’s because the total length is about 75 km (  15.0 km
per line   5 lines). Presumably, Mizutani’s data set is based on urban rail
organizations so that the network size would be smaller. In other words,
Japanese railway systems are more densely operated than those in other
countries.
Based on Mizutani’s result, we evaluate the size of the railway organiza-
tion. His result shows that large private railways, which are considered the
most eﬃcient rail operators in Japan, could be approximating optimally
sized railways. The Odakyu line operating in Tokyo might be an optimally
sized railway operating under ideal conditions. If Mizutani’s result is cor-
rect, JR Shikoku is perhaps too small and the Honshu JR companies too
big in terms of costs.
12.5.2 Functional Division: Passenger and Freight Services
We think that functional division was correct for Japan, where railways
are mostly for passenger transport. Freight transport is by either truck or
ship, with rail holding only a 4.2 percent share on a ton-kilometer basis.
Clearly, before privatization, the freight section of JNR was unproﬁtable,
unable to compete with trucking companies and deﬁcient in marketing
skill. In fact, JNR’s freight division was one of the main sources of JNR’s
operating deﬁcits. If such an unproﬁtable establishment had been attached
to any of the JR passenger companies, their prospects for success would
have been reduced, and their listing on the stock market would have been
less favorable.
We might also cite the argument of scope economies in order to ration-
The Japanese Experience with Railway Restructuring 331alize the separation of passenger and freight service. Several researchers
have noted that there are diseconomies of scope with passenger and freight
operations in the railway industry (Kim 1987; Preston 1996). From this
point of view, it is not necessary to provide both passenger and freight ser-
vices under the same train company. Instead, the consolidation of freight
rail companies with trucking companies may be preferable.
12.5.3 Operation and Infrastructure Integration: Vertical Integration
The issue of vertical integration still stimulates much debate in the rail
industry. The relationship between operation and railway infrastructure
can take many forms (Brooks and Button 1995). In the European style, for
example in the case of the BR privatization, rail operation was separated
from infrastructure. In Japan, JR passenger companies hold rail tracks, as
most other Japanese private railways do, and cases involving only oper-
ation or only ownership of infrastructure are very limited, with Kobe
Kosoku and JR Freight being examples of the few.
Empirical results are insuﬃcient to allow a policy judgment on this is-
sue, as a concrete theory has yet to be developed in the rail industry. How-
ever, transport economists have discussed advantages and disadvantages,
as did the British economist Nash (1997), who wrote of the BR experience.
Vertical separation makes it easier to (1) promote a variety of operators,
(2) clarify intra-industry relationships, and (3) specialize activities. On the
other hand, vertical separation makes it diﬃcult to (1) set up fair prices
and monitor performance, (2) organize time-tabling and slot allocation of
trains, (3) negotiate arrangements for investment projects, (4) maintain
safety of train operation, and (5) provide integrated information and tick-
eting.
There are two important factors that make a vertically separated system
undesirable in Japan. The ﬁrst factor concerns transaction costs, and the
second is the existence of economies of scope between operation and in-
frastructure providing services. Although we do not have clear evidence,
vertical integration or a separation policy is related to these two factors,
which may depend on traﬃc density. For example, under the condition of
low traﬃc density, the integrated system is not eﬃcient because the ﬁxed
cost of track maintenance is too high and the rail company could save
money by outsourcing with a construction company. Transaction costs re-
lated to separation are not signiﬁcantly large because the traﬃc is not so
heavy that transactions between two companies could not be conducted on
an ordinary basis. On the other hand, as traﬃc density increases, scope
economies between the two activities come into play so that the company
has an incentive to carry out the two activities. At least, it may be said that
there are diseconomies of scale when the two activities are separated. Fur-
thermore, transaction costs related to separation become larger. As many
transport economists point out, in the scheduling of track maintenance
332 Fumitoshi Mizutani and Kiyoshi Nakamuraunder heavy operation, and with regard to investment plans for signals and
tracks that aﬀect train operation, cost allocation between the two activities
will be a considerable issue between the two companies. As a result, trans-
action costs related to these will increase, such as the opportunity cost
of meeting-time, the legal costs of reaching agreements, and the costs of
reducing asymmetric information. All these costs make a vertically inte-
grated system seem desirable.
Cost eﬃciency does not exist in vertical separation in the rail industry.
Mizutani and Shoji (2001) attempt to evaluate this subject with a limited
data set. Their methodology is straightforward. First, they construct the
cost function for track maintenance activities by using a vertically inte-
grated system. Second, they substitute the data of a vertically separated or-
ganization, in this case the Kobe Kosoku railway, into the estimated cost
function and obtain the infrastructure cost. Finally, they compare these es-
timated infrastructure costs, which are considered as a case of a vertically
integrated system with the actual costs of a vertically separated system.
They ﬁnd that the vertically separated system costs about 5.6 percent more
than the vertically integrated system, and thus conclude that there are no
signiﬁcant cost diﬀerences between the two systems. This is a just case
based on reported accounting costs of railway ﬁrms; opportunity costs of
transactions, especially time costs of meeting, negotiation, and search, are
not included. If we consider these costs, a separated system might be more
expensive than an integrated system.
In summary, in the case of low traﬃc density, a vertically separated sys-
tem is cheaper than a vertically integrated system but in the case of higher
traﬃc density, the integrated system may be better. The policy option for
vertical separation was not considered at all when JNR was privatized
(Suga 1997), because when compared with European railways, the much
higher traﬃc volume of the JRs makes it less likely to succeed with a sepa-
rated system.
12.5.4 Yardstick Competition
A yardstick competition scheme is used for avoiding ineﬃciency result-
ing from a too-lenient licensing system. Compared with an open-access
system, in which operators are selected by tendering, a yardstick compe-
tition scheme is less rigorous but still encourages competition. Shleifer
(1985) originally proposed the conceptual framework of yardstick compe-
tition, which is considered competition among companies in diﬀerent mar-
kets. The essence of the scheme is for regulators to evaluate companies’ per-
formance with selected performance measures. For example, a regulator
sets up several performance measures, such as operating costs or produc-
tivity, and evaluates companies’ performance. If a company can be shown
to perform relatively better than other companies in these measures, then
the company may receive rewards (e.g., their proposal for increased fares
The Japanese Experience with Railway Restructuring 333can be accepted). On the other hand, a company that performs less well
might be penalized by having its requested fare increase rejected. Thus, this
scheme is a kind of incentive regulation in order to improve companies’ eﬃ-
ciency by introducing competition. In Japan, yardstick competition has
been used since the mid-1970s in reviewing proposals for fare revision
among ﬁfteen large private railways. The evaluation measures considered
in Japan are productivity growth, cost reduction, and improvement of rail
ridership, and if these measures cannot be shown to equal or surpass those
of other rail companies, then changes in rail fare are not fully granted by
the regulator. While yardstick competition has been used for more than two
decades for evaluating large private railways, it has been used at the JRs
only since 1997, and cannot yet be shown to have clear eﬀects. Competition
certainly works to some degree in the large private railways to which the
yardstick competition scheme applies (Mizutani 1997).
In the long run, a licensing system incorporating yardstick competition
may attain more eﬃciency. Long-term commitment to a line is also impor-
tant. Private rail companies in Japan have traditionally shown this com-
mitment by developing real estate and shopping establishments along rail
lines. A company involved only in rail operations might not share this long-
term commitment, in the uncertainty that it may lose its operating license
at some point. It is conceivable that an operations-only company, with
its attention focused only on fulﬁlling the minimal promises of a written
contract, might lose the entrepreneurial behavior characteristic of a ma-
jor private rail company. Service quality might therefore suﬀer, ultimately
leading to a change in the location of households and further decline in rail
business.
In conclusion, a yardstick competition scheme seems a useful part of the
licensing system in the long run. So far, the larger private rail companies
in Japan that operate within the yardstick scheme have performed well,
demonstrating a commitment to the development of a pleasant housing
environment along their lines and quality rail service on their trains.
12.6 Concluding Remarks
In conclusion, the Japanese approach to rail restructuring has succeeded
in many ways, by improving productivity, cutting operating deﬁcits, de-
creasing fares, and providing better services. Although political interven-
tion after privatization has lessened, JR companies are not yet totally in-
dependent because the privatization process is not yet complete. Local rail
services in small communities have been maintained for the past ten years
but there are no guarantees that these will survive any serious ﬁnancial
slump the JRs might someday experience.
While the Japanese privatization has been largely a success, there remain
a number of problems to be solved in the near future. Care must be taken
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power from a public corporation to the private sector. The main objective
of privatization policy is to introduce many kinds of competition, and it is
the government’s role to create a competitive environment and to promote
actual and potential competition in the market and even within the organ-
ization itself by using incentive regulations. Furthermore, in Japan the
older and very successful large private railways have served as good role
models for the newly privatized JRs. The former national railway was con-
servative, indolent, and fearful of change. The privatization process has
served to rouse it from its former, rather inert state into something much
more purposeful.
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Comment Mario B. Lamberte
This paper discusses the most recent experience of Japan in restructuring
and privatizing a rather large and important utility, the Japan Railway. The
privatization is still unﬁnished, yet some lessons already can be drawn from
the experience. What I gathered from the paper is that Japan made a very
careful plan for and then execution of privatization. For example, JNR was
divided into six regional companies (JRs): each one would complete 95
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Mario B. Lamberte is president of the Philippine Institute for Development Studies.percent of all trips within the borders of the region, and there was to be one
nationwide freight company. The privatization of each of these companies
was done sequentially. The timing of the privatization was as important as
the sequence. Rather than copying in toto the railway privatization pro-
gram implemented in other advanced economies, the Japanese govern-
ment took a slightly diﬀerent route that was most suited to Japan’s condi-
tions. For instance, it opted for vertical integration instead of vertical
separation, allowing the JRs to reduce transaction costs and exploit
economies of scope between operation and infrastructure. More impor-
tantly, the privatization immediately yielded some beneﬁts to the Japanese
society and minimized social costs.
In describing the reasons for privatization, it would help the readers if
the authors had started with a discussion about the market structure of the
railway industry. I gathered from certain sections of the paper that JNR
was facing competition not only from motorization but also from the exis-
tence of relatively eﬃcient private railway companies. Do each of the JRs
operating in their respective geographical areas face ﬁerce competition
with private companies? The presence of vertically integrated private rail-
way companies could have also been a major consideration in opting for
vertical integration.
In developing economies, like the Philippines, the railway industry usu-
ally is monopolized by state-owned enterprises. Privatization results in a
transfer of monopoly power from the government to the private company.
Regulation and supervision therefore must be strong. Unfortunately, reg-
ulatory capture occurs most of the time. Therefore, this makes the experi-
ence of Japan even more interesting, because private companies were al-
lowed to operate in the railway industry even before the privatization of
JNR. I am very interested in the legal and regulatory framework that Ja-
pan put in place to allow those private railway companies to operate. This
could be an alternative route that less developed countries could use when
they privatize their railroad companies.
One of the interesting features of the JNR privatization was the setting
up of an intermediate institution to repay the debts of JNR and to ﬁnd new
jobs for redundant employees. That feature would make the privatization
of JNR acceptable to those who would be adversely aﬀected in terms of
employment. However, it is not clear to me what programs the intermedi-
ary institution undertook to make the transfer to other government agen-
cies smooth. Were there pressures exerted by the central government on
other government agencies to accept the redundant workers of JNR? It
could be diﬃcult to transfer redundant workers from JNR to other gov-
ernment agencies, unless these government agencies also are growing and
therefore need some additional labor.
Table 12.3 shows the overall performance changes of the JRs since pri-
vatization. My understanding is that only JR East, JR West, and JR Cen-
The Japanese Experience with Railway Restructuring 337tral have been privatized so far. It might help if the authors compared the
performance of those JRs that already have been privatized with those that
have not yet been privatized. More importantly, they should describe the
diﬀerence in governance structure in these two groups of JRs. They should
also describe the extent to which the government formally or informally
controls the three privatized JRs, since it still holds at least 30 percent of
the total shares outstanding.
In table 12.4, the authors show a comparison of the fares between the
JRs and private companies before and after the privatization. Although
there seems to be improvement in the price competitiveness of the JRs, we
still notice signiﬁcant diﬀerences. Theoretically, the fares of JRs and pri-
vate companies should converge unless the former have retained some
monopoly power. Perhaps the authors can expand more on this issue and
speculate when these fares will become approximately the same. It would
certainly help the reader if the authors gave an idea of the market shares of
the JRs and the private railway companies in the same market.
The privatization plan and sequencing outlined in table 12.1 is some-
thing that a country planning to privatize its railway industry must learn.
The downloading of fare-setting from the Diet to the regulatory agency
certainly depoliticized the process. I wonder if there is a fair and transpar-
ent process followed by the regulatory agency in revising rates, because the
process itself still could be highly politicized.
Some of the questions that the authors should have answered, which
surely will be of interest to those who are looking seriously at the JNR ex-
perience as a model, are the following:
1. How is the board of the JRs organized?
2. When should the remaining JRs be privatized? Should the govern-
ment wait until Japan’s stock market recovers?
3. What would be the additional costs to be borne by the government by
retaining some JRs?
Comment Helen Owens
The Mizutani and Nakamura paper provides a clear summary of recent re-
form initiatives relating to Japanese railways. On many issues it represents
a convergence of ideas with those of the Australian Productivity Commis-
sion (PC), which were formed while undertaking a major review of Aus-
tralian railways two years ago (PC 1999).
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on the commission’s 1999 inquiry into progress in rail reform.I would like to provide comment on three general matters.
The ﬁrst is the Japanese approach to rail reform, which has included
both structural reform and partial privatization of some railways. There
would appear to be a strong case for the horizontal separation, by region,
of JNR, which appears to have experienced similar problems to those of
other large, publicly owned corporations worldwide. These include com-
placency, poor management, antagonistic labor relations, overstaﬃng,
huge debts, low morale, political interference, and diseconomies of scale.
These problems tend to result in an increased dependence on government
subsidies, reduced productivity, poor-quality services, and a reduced abil-
ity to compete on an intermodal basis with road and air services.
Horizontal separation holds the promise that rail service providers will
be better able to meet diﬀerent local needs. It can facilitate organizational
changes and yardstick competition across businesses. It can also improve
the eﬀectiveness of government regulatory regimes and enable government
to design contractual arrangements to meet noncommercial objectives (so-
cial, regional, and environmental).
On the downside, there may be issues relating to lack of coordination
between geographically separated entities and interface issues where the
freight operator traverses diﬀerent passenger networks with multiple own-
ers. On balance, the beneﬁts of horizontal separation by region are likely
to far outweigh the costs.
In regard to horizontal separation by product (or function), I would tend
to agree with the authors that there are strong arguments for separating
passenger from freight operations in Japan. This will ensure management
has clear responsibility and that privatization of the more proﬁtable pas-
senger businesses is not undermined by loss-making freight operations.
Potentially, the needs of diﬀerent types of users (passengers, freight for-
warders) can be met more eﬀectively. Also, to the extent that the freight
company traverses diﬀerent passenger networks, it would not make sense
to link it to one passenger railway.
The authors also cite evidence of diseconomies of scope. Recent experi-
ence in New Zealand with the horizontally and vertically integrated, pri-
vately owned TranzRail suggests that retaining loss-making urban and
long-distance passenger services within a privatized entity can undermine
its overall operations, despite regional government subsidies. In 2001
TranzRail repositioned itself as mainly a bulk freight operator, having sold
the long-distance passenger service operating between Auckland and Wel-
lington (an intercity commuter operation) as well as two proﬁtable tourist
train services on the South Island.
Once again, I agree with the authors that vertical integration of track
and operations is the appropriate approach in the Japanese context.
There are a number of possible advantages to vertically separating train
operations from track infrastructure services. According to the Organiza-
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ciency can be enhanced by introducing rail on rail competition through
vertical separation when
• existing rail operators possess natural monopoly characteristics such
as economies of scale and have eﬀective market power;
• other operators can compete on a commercially sustainable basis; and
• track infrastructure and train operations are relatively independent so
that the costs of separation are small in relation to the gains from
competition and eﬃcient economic regulation.
However, despite the relatively large size of some Japanese passenger
markets, market power may not eventuate given the degree of intermodal
competition. Thus the opportunities for competitive entry could be lim-
ited.
Other problems with vertical separation (and subsequent greater rail-
on-rail competition) noted by the authors include the diﬃculties of moni-
toring performance; organizing time-tabling and slot allocation; main-
taining safety (as evident in United Kingdom); and undertaking long-term
investment planning.
In addition, the authors noted that the potential for adversarial rela-
tionships to develop between the track owner and operating companies (as
manifested in the United Kingdom) may be a problem. In the case of the
three Japanese Honshu companies operating high-density services, it is es-
pecially important to avoid complications associated with train schedule
allocation, time-tabling, and capacity management.
The authors argued that vertical separation may be more appropriate un-
der conditions of low traﬃc density. However, to the extent that rail busi-
nesses encounter high ﬁxed costs associated with ineﬃcient track main-
tenance, these could be more easily reduced by outsourcing maintenance
while maintaining ownership and control. This approach also would avoid
any transactions costs of changing ownership.
On balance, the PC review concluded that the beneﬁts and costs of struc-
tural separation are likely to diﬀer between network types. It would appear
that, in the case of Japan, the characteristics of its transport market would
suggest the approach adopted to structural reform is largely appropriate.
The problems encountered by JNR also strongly suggest that privatiza-
tion or other measures to introduce greater private-sector involvement are
appropriate. However, I have some concerns about the privatization pro-
cess. To date, only three of the seven companies formed from JNR have
been partially privatized and the process has been very slow. Six years
elapsed from the initial announcement in 1987 until the ﬁrst partial priva-
tization of JR East in 1993. The partial privatization of JR West and JR
Central followed in 1996 and 1997, respectively. The decision to privatize
slowly appears to be aimed at giving the companies more time to become
340 Fumitoshi Mizutani and Kiyoshi Nakamuramore eﬃcient and show a proﬁt in order to increase the sale price and
hence government revenue. However, it is unclear why private purchasers
would not recognize the potential for future eﬃciency gains and factor
them into the purchase price.
An alternative approach adopted in other countries would be to priva-
tize the businesses as going concerns in order to promote faster eﬃciency
gains, with ongoing community beneﬁts from lower prices probably ex-
ceeding any forgone budget revenue.
The danger with the Japanese strategy is that other forces, such as reces-
sion or political changes, could cause the process to lose momentum or
stall altogether, as appears to be the case. The opportunity for more eﬃ-
cient operations is therefore lost.
Another concern relates to the strategy to privatize the three Honshu rail
companies only partially. Again, a danger exists that tensions may arise be-
tween the government and private shareholders, as well as that of ongoing
political interference in the companies that could restrict organizational
and managerial ﬂexibility.
Finally, the authors mention that in privatizing the three Honshu com-
panies, jobs were found for redundant employees with other government
agencies, including local governments, the tax oﬃce, the police, and the
meteorological bureau. If one were to take a whole-government perspec-
tive, this may simply shift the ineﬃciency from one government agency to
others.
The second matter on which I would like to comment is the performance
of Japanese railways presented in table 12.2 of the paper. It is hard to dis-
entangle the impact of structural reform from privatization as the two pro-
cesses overlap. Only the data for 1998 relate to the period since privatization
of the three Honshu companies (in 1993, 1996, and 1997), so there are in-
suﬃcient data points to be deﬁnitive about the eﬀect of privatization. Fur-
ther, one year is insuﬃcient time to gauge the impact of the privatization of
JR Central. Nevertheless, the data are starting to tell an interesting story.
For the three privatized companies,
• the operating revenue–cost ratio increased between 1987 and 1992 but
fell again in 1998 after privatization (this may be due in part to reces-
sion);
• average fares fell consistently for JR East and JR West, but rose
slightly for JR Central in 1998 (although they were still marginally
lower than in 1987); and
• labor productivity rose consistently for JR East and JR West, but in-
creased and then fell for JR Central (although they were still higher
than in 1987).
However, labor productivity also rose signiﬁcantly for the four nonpri-
vatized companies, possibly reﬂecting the impact of structural reform. The
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but fell for JR Freight. Average operating costs were lower in 1998 than
1987 for all passenger companies but rose for JR Freight. From these re-
sults it would appear that any improvements in performance are likely to
relate more to structural reform than privatization per se.
My third point is that franchising is an alternative approach to reform
that could have been considered. It is clear from the paper that the publicly
owned Three-Islands passenger companies are still operating at a loss, as
is JR Freight, possibly explaining why they are yet to be privatized under
the policy of waiting until they become proﬁtable. This may take a long
time, given the slow improvements to date.
Another approach that could be considered for the Three-Islands com-
panies would be to promote “competition for the market” by entering into
franchise agreements or contracts with the private sector. To the extent that
these services are noncommercial and require continued government sup-
port, private companies could tender competitively to operate the service
at the lowest subsidy. Investment, quality, and other performance require-
ments could be incorporated into franchise agreements (or contracts). This
would overcome the concerns of the authors with such an approach.
This approach was adopted in the Australian state of Victoria in 1999 for
all urban and nonurban passenger services. The urban passenger opera-
tions were split into two companies and franchised to separate private
companies, one of which also operates the nonurban passenger service.
The franchisees lease the track infrastructure. The franchise agreements,
which were originally designed to run for ten to ﬁfteen years, specify pas-
senger service levels, maximum fares, and operational performance. In-
vestment commitments are also speciﬁed in the contracts, along with sub-
sidy payments.
An approach involving “competition for the market” could be consid-
ered for loss-making railways.
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